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Executive summary and policy recommendations
Debt presents one of the main stumbling blocks to least developed countries’ (LDCs)
social and economic development. Many LDCs have unsustainable debt burdens, in
addition to the 31 LDCs that are classified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs).
At least six other LDCs have, even according to rather conservative and narrowly
defined World Bank and IMF criteria, debt levels that exceed their repayment capacity.
When the concept of debt sustainability is approached from a human and social
development perspective—and there is no other way to approach debt sustainability in a
country such as Bangladesh where 78 per cent of the people live on US$ 2 a day—many
more LDCs have an unsustainable debt level.
Thus far, attempts to end the LDCs’ everlasting cycle of poverty, aid dependency and
unsustainable debt levels, have failed. The enhanced HIPC Initiative, as
‘groundbreaking’ as it appears at first sight, risks being another false promise. As it
currently stands, it is unlikely that the enhanced HIPC Initiative will achieve even its
limited aim of offering an exit from the rescheduling process. More importantly, it is
unlikely to release sufficient resources to tackle poverty in LDCs.
There are three main reasons for this. First, as indicated above, several LDCs with
significant debt burdens are not included in the initiative. The problem is, first of all,
that the threshold levels to measure debt sustainability are arbitrary and still too high.
Another, more important problem is that sustainability is defined in economic terms and
not in terms of human and social development, in spite of the fact that there is broad
consensus in the international community that debt needs to be seen in a broader context
and that the human development perspective must be incorporated in the HIPC
Initiative.
The second main reason why the HIPC Initiative is not likely to reach its goal, is that
the debt reduction on offer is probably too small. Zambia and Niger will actually pay
more after the initiative than they did before. For five out of sixteen HIPC-LDCs for
which data are available, the NPV of their debt level in 2005 is still above the IMF and
World Bank threshold ratio of 150 per cent. In addition, some countries will see large
fluctuations in debt servicing, followed in most cases by significant drops in the
following years. Furthermore, after 2005, debt service levels start rising again. For
eleven out of the thirteen HIPC-LDCs for which post-2005 debt service data are
available, debt service starts to increase after 2005 and for nine HIPC-LDCs, future
levels are far above present debt service levels. The fact that all HIPC-LDCs are
projected to have sustainable debt levels in 2018 cannot be attributed to declining debt
levels, but to improved economic performance. As has been the case in the past,
however, the projections are very optimistic, and there is a real risk that in the long run,
most HIPC-LDCs will be back to where they are now.
The third problem is the piling up of different sets of conditionalities. The introduction
of the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) as a condition for debt relief not only
involves a change of emphasis, but also an extension of policy conditions. In addition to
traditional macroeconomic and structural reforms, the country must also implement a
number of agreed social development policies. This delays the road to the completion
point, the point at which countries receive unconditional and irrevocable relief.
Moreover, the linkage between the HIPC Initiative and the PRS also erodes the quality
of the PRS, as countries are in a rush to enter the initiative.2
At the same time as conditionalities pile up, the PRSPs do not succeed in aligning
macroeconomic issues and poverty issues any more closely than in the past and
macroeconomic frameworks have not changed significantly as a result of PRSPs. The
European Union (EU) is now in the position to take up the challenge to ensure that the
poverty focus is included in the design of macroeconomic adjustment measures. The EU
will co-finance the new (IDA) poverty reduction support credits, which are based on
PRSPs. The EU finances the grant part (PRSG) and the World Bank the credit part
(PRSC). The indicators, objectives, timetables and conditionalities for the PRSC and the
PRSG are the same and they are jointly defined. Although the EU assessment will not
be included in the World Bank assessment of the PRS process, it is likely that the EU
and the World Bank have common informal assessments of the PRSP.
Policy recommendations
I. Debt sustainability—and the subsequent levels of debt reduction needed—has to be
assessed from a broader human development perspective. This perspective should
measure at what level debt servicing is ‘affordable’ as a percentage of government
revenues, explicitly acknowledging that the scarce resources available to LDC
governments should first be used to meet the basic human needs of their
populations. Using this methodology, it becomes clear that significant additional
debt reductions are needed in order for LDCs to reach debt sustainability while
tackling poverty.
II. Second, debt reduction should not be linked to the completion and implementation
of PRSPs because the latter involves long, complex and comprehensive
development planning while debt reductions are urgently needed to release some
extra resources to start to meet the most basic needs of HIPCs. These two processes
should instead be made parallel at this early stage. This would allow debt relief to
proceed quickly without damaging the PRS process and it would free up some
resources to help the poverty analysis/participation aspects required in the first steps
of a PRSP while also allowing some basic poverty investments to be undertaken
immediately. Furthermore, it has been shown that specific mechanisms such as the
one implemented in Uganda, enable efficient monitoring of resources freed by debt
relief for poverty reduction purposes.
III. In this respect, the EU should use its leverage as co-financer of the poverty
reduction support credits to challenge the World Bank and IMF as well as finance
ministries to genuinely integrate poverty reduction in their macroeconomic policy
and structural adjustment advice.
IV. Although literally lifesaving for debtors, the additional efforts required by creditors
to reach appropriate debt reduction levels for the LDCs do not constitute a very
heavy financial burden. For Paris Club bilateral creditors, the true economic value of
their loans is far less than the nominal value. Recent academic research suggests that
the cost of cancellation can be as low as 10 per cent of face value. For non-Paris
Club creditors who refuse to participate in the HIPC Initiative, non-payment of
loans should be officially condoned in most cases. The IMF itself acknowledges the
fact that it can easily write off its debts to the HIPC countries by using the earning
capacity of its general reserves, together with a repeat of limited revaluation of its3
undervalued gold reserves. Even though the situation is somewhat more complicated
for the World Bank, independent evidence suggests that a hundred per cent
cancellation of HIPC debt by the Bank would be possible with the prudent use of a
small proportion of the IBRD’s reserves and an ongoing commitment from its net
income. Greater bilateral donor support and bigger contributions from the World
Bank to the HIPC trust fund will be needed to cancel further regional multilateral
development banks loans (MDBs).
V. Furthermore, the World Bank and IMF should make substantial efforts to support
conflict-affected LDCs that have large arrears, as these countries have been unable
to repay their debts for many years. These countries’ arrears should be cancelled
now. Numerous papers have been produced by the Bank and the Fund, exploring
different options to help these countries. Since these proposals depend on bilateral
donor contributions, and these have hardly been forthcoming, they have not
materialized.
VI. To prevent LDCs from falling into the same debt trap as they are now, much deeper
debt relief is needed, but also, current borrowing and lending practises should be
changed. LDCs remain dependent on external support, and it is essential that this
support is on proper terms and that it is properly used. Irresponsible borrowing
could be prevented by (i) making sure the internal disbursement of external finance
is carried out in an accountable and transparent manner; (ii) the use of funding is
consistent with the PRS; (iii) a monitoring system, involving civil society and
parliament, is put in place to allow for the monitoring of internal disbursement at the
national, regional and local level. In addition to responsible use of resources,
responsible borrowing and lending requires that the type of finance is adjusted to its
spending purpose. For example, finance for non-income generating purposes, such
as health, should preferably be on a grant basis, and finance for directly income-
generating projects, such as the building of factories, can be on a concessional loan
basis.
1 Introduction
The most impoverished and vulnerable countries of the world are grouped under the
category of ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs). One of the main reasons why
development efforts have failed in LDCs, is that instead of investing in social and
economic development, these countries are forced to use scarce government resources
to finance external debt to foreign creditors. For example, in Burkina Faso, where one
out of five children dies before the age of five, in 1998 the government spent as much
on debt as on health. And in Niger, where 78 per cent of adult males and 93 per cent of
adult women are illiterate, debt service amounted to 3.1 per cent of GNP in 1998, while
spending on education was only 2.3 per cent of GNP.
Tackling the debt crisis is essential for these countries. If creditors fail to significantly
reduce the debt level of LDCs, social and economic development and poverty reduction
remain nothing but paper aims.
The next section of this paper addresses the question of how large the debt burden of
LDCs actually is and how this burden affects the LDCs’ path to social and economic4
development. Section 3 describes current efforts to reduce the debt burden. As current
approaches are very likely to fail, new approaches to end the debt crisis are proposed in
section 4. Finally, section 5 describes the measures for preventing future debt crises.
2 The meaning of debt
Many of the world’s least developed countries face a huge debt burden, which is a
major constraint to their development. The amount of credit issued to these countries by
bilateral creditor countries, multilateral agencies, and to a lesser extent commercial
banks, has led to a piling up of the debt burden and to debt service requirements that
surpass by far these countries’ repayment capacities. How large is the debt burden of
LDCs and how does it influence these countries’ social and economic development?
Before answering this question, two issues will be clarified: the concept of debt
sustainability and the rather confusing classifications of LDCs and heavily indebted
poor countries (HIPCs).
2.1 When is debt unsustainable?
The definition of debt sustainability commonly used by creditors for low-
income countries is whether or not a country can meet its current and future external
debt servicing obligations in full, without recourse to further debt relief, rescheduling or
accumulation of arrears, and without unduly compromising growth. This is sometimes
summarized as providing a permanent ‘exit’ from the rescheduling process.1
The main problem with the creditor’s definition is that debt sustainability is being
confined to a matter of economics. This is recognized by the World Bank and the IMF
(WB/IMF 2001a):
This definition [ … ] is quite narrow from an overall development
perspective. It does not deal with issues of domestic debt, which are
important for fiscal sustainability, nor does it measure the adequacy of
public resources to address priority development programs after debt
service has been paid.
Nevertheless, these institutions maintain this definition, which they address with the
following indicators:
– Net present value of debt-to-exports ratio of 150 per cent;
1 Ideally, a country should be ‘externally viable’. As defined by the IMF, external viability means that a
country is capable of paying its external obligations with its own resources (tax revenues, external
account surpluses and non-concessional borrowing) and does not need to resort to donor assistance
(e.g. concessional loans or grants). Thus, a country is considered externally viable when it does not
require external balance-of-payments support to close any financing gaps or budget deficits. However,
for low-income countries, it has long been assumed that external viability can only be a long-term
target, and is unlikely to be achieved in the short to medium term. See Eurodad (2000a).5
– Net present value of debt-to-government revenue of 250 per cent;2
– Debt-service-to-exports ratio of 15-20 per cent;
These indicators do not truly reflect the burden of debt. First of all, the emphasis is on
debt stock rather than debt service. Furthermore, many LDCs have accumulated such
large debt stocks that only a fraction of it is actually being repaid. From a resources
perspective, it is debt servicing that counts.3
In addition, the focus is on exports. Even though exports are an important source of
foreign exchange, which is needed for debt repayments, the debt-to-export ratio can be
misleading as rapid growth in exports does not always translate into more budgetary
resources for the government.4 In addition, the volatility of currency and commodity
markets also makes the debt-to-export ratio an unreliable benchmark to predict debt
sustainability in the medium term.
The fiscal criterion is a more appropriate indicator, as it takes the amount of resources
available to the government as a starting point. However, creditors only use it from a
debt stock perspective and not from a flow perspective. Furthermore, the threshold for
the fiscal indicator is very high, as are the thresholds for the two conditions to qualify
for debt relief via the fiscal indicator (see Table 5 in section 3).5 To qualify for the fiscal
indicator implies an impossible mixture of high indebtedness and macroeconomic
soundness.
The present value of debt-to-export ratio is equally inappropriate. According to the
World Bank and the IMF, the empirical threshold of the net present value of debt-to-
export ratio should be 200 per cent. The institutions have decided to lower this to 150
per cent to ‘provide more of a cushion from exogenous shocks and to free up resources
for poverty reduction’ (WB/IMF 2001a: 5). However, the data used to derive the
threshold of 200 per cent mainly come from middle-income countries, making no
special allowance for the special situation of the LDCs or HIPCs. Research suggests that
the historical present value of debt-to-export threshold level for HIPCs is 140 per cent.
In short, the debt sustainability indicators being used by the creditors are inappropriate,
arbitrary and conservative. A possible alternative approach—one that puts human
development at the centre of debt sustainability—is described in detail in section 4.
2 To qualify for this criterion, the exports/GDP ratio should be 30 per cent or more and the government
revenue/GDP ratio should be 15 per cent or more.
3 It should be noted, though, that the ‘debt overhang’ acts as an incentive to foreign investors and
affects internal resource allocation.
4 For example, in Tanzania, export revenues might be expected to rise rapidly, thanks to the recent
exploitation of gold resources. However, given the capital-intensive nature of the industry, the
government has agreed to accept relatively low revenue whilst foreign investors are recouping their
investment costs in order to attract investment into the sector.
5 The fiscal indicator has been introduced mainly because of pressure from France, which wanted to
ensure that Côte d’Ivoire would be eligible for the HIPC Initiative.6
2.2 About LDCs and HIPCs
Even though LDCs are, by definition, very poor and many are also heavily indebted, not
all LDCs are classified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). The World Bank
and the IMF currently classify 41 countries as HIPCs. The group of 49 LDCs shows
considerable overlap with these HIPCs. More specifically, 31 out of 49 LDCs are
HIPC-LDCs and ten HIPCs are non LDC-HIPCs (Figure 1). Eighteen LDCs are not
classified as HIPCs.
Clearly, the classifications of HIPCs and LDCs are rather arbitrary (see also Box 1). Not
only because several non HIPC-LDCs have unsustainable debts, as section 2.4
demonstrates, but also because all HIPCs are very poor and underdeveloped, even
though they do not meet the criteria to fit in the LDC category.
Figure 1


































































What are LDCs and what is a HIPC?
A county is designated as a least developed country if it meets inclusion thresholds on the following
three criteria (UNCTAD 2000):
a) Al o wi n c o m e : income to be below a GDP per capita of US$ 800;
b) Weak human resources, measured by the Augmented Physical Quality of Life Index, which
is based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie intake, combined
primary and secondary school enrolment, and adult literacy;
c) A low level of economic diversification , measured by the Economic Diversification Index,
which is based on the share of manufacturing in GDP. The share of the labour force in
industry, annual per capita commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD's merchandise
export concentration index.
The classification of HIPCs seems to be based on a rule of thumb rather than on clear-cut quantitative
criteria. In 1996, when the category was introduced, the group of HIPCs consisted of 32 severely
indebted low-income countries and nine other countries. To be classified as severely indebted in 1996:
a) Present value of debt service to GDP to exceed 80 per cent, or
b) Present value of debt to exports to exceed 220 per cent;
Two other common denominators of this group are that the countries only borrow on highly
concessional terms from the World Bank (from the Bank’s International Development Association, IDA)
and they have negotiated, or are prepared to negotiate, a concessional rescheduling with the Paris
Club.
Since 1996, the original group of 41 HIPCs has gone through some changes. Nigeria was soon ruled
ineligible, as it also borrowed from the World Bank’s non-concessional window, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In 1999, Malawi was included and in the summer of 2000,
Gambia was added as well. Equatorial Guinea was declassified as a HIPC in early 2000, as, with the
onset of oil production, GDP levels rose above those required for IDA-only assistance.
Source: UNCTAD (2000).
2.3 Debt and social development
What is the meaning of debt? What impact does an ‘unsustainable debt’ have?
Unsustainable debt keeps countries caught in a cycle of poverty, aid dependency and
unsustainable debt levels. Through several mechanisms, it represents a major stumbling
block to economic and social development and poverty reduction.
The most obvious constraint is the cash flow implication of debt service obligations, the
so-called crowding out effect. As governments have to pay large sums of money to
foreign creditors, less can be spent on recurrent social expenditure or essential
investments, such as infrastructure, health or education. LDCs, with extremely low
levels of social and human development (see Annex 2), often pay more to foreign
creditors than they can afford to invest in basic health care or education.
For example, in Burkina Faso, where one out of five children dies before the age of five,
the government spent in 1998 as much on debt as on health (US$ 5 per capita in 1998
and US$ 5 per capita in 1990-98). And in Niger, where 78 per cent of adult males and
93 per cent of adult women are illiterate, debt service amounted to 3.1 per cent of GNP
in 1998, while spending on education was only 2.3 per cent of GNP. Another example is8
Table 1
Spending on debt compared to spending on basic social services
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Benin 10.3 10.3 8 2.7 3.2
Burkina Faso 5.0 4.6 5 2.1 1.5
Burundi 4.6 7.8 5 3.5 4.0
C. A. R 8.7 8.7 – 2.9 –
Chad 4.9 5.7 7 2.1 1.7
Congo, D. R. 0.4 12.4 – 0.3 –
Ethiopia 1.9 9.9 4 1.8 4.0
Gambia, The 21.8 16.6 11 6.4 4.9
Guinea 22.4 24.0 13 4.6 1.9
Guinea-Bissau 6.6 37.1 – 4.1 –
Lao P. D. R. 6.2 5.9 6 2.5 2.1
Liberia 0.3 22.0 – – –
Madagascar 8.6 11.3 5 3.4 1.9
Malawi 8 7.8 5 4.7 5.4
Mali 7.7 10.4 10 3.1 2.2
Mauritania 44 60.7 28 11.6 5.1
Mozambique 6.2 15.4 – 2.8 –
Myanmar 2.1 7.1 58 – 1.2
Niger 6.1 10.4 – 3.1 2.3
Rwanda 2.6 3.9 – 1.0 –
S a oT o m eeP r i n c i p e 26.1 49.7 – – –
Sierra Leone 4.1 8.4 14 3.2 –
Somalia 0 5.6 – – –
Sudan 2.2 10.0 – 0.7 0.9
U. R. Tanzania 7.7 8.1 – 3.0 –
Togo 8.9 17.2 11 2.7 4.5
Uganda 7.7 21.3 14 2.4 2.6
Zambia 20.8 38.9 14 6.4 2.2
Angola 112.8 140.3 – 33.0 –
Yemen 7.5 11.4 18 3.2 7.0
Non HIPC-LDCs
Bangladesh 5.4 5.3 12 1.5 2.2
Bhutan 12.1 9.1 12 – –
Cambodia 1.1 12.1 17 0.4 2.9
Cape Verde 46.2 60.0 – – –
Comoros Islands 11.7 19.8 – – –
Djibouti 8.7 25.3 – – –
Equatorial Guinea 13.9 18.3 – – –
Eritrea 1.0 0.8 – 0.5 1.8
Haiti 5.1 4.5 17 1.0 –
Lesotho 24.2 24.7 – 4.8 8.4
Maldives 50.8 59.0 – – –
Nepal 3.8 4.0 11 1.8 3.2
Samoa 29.6 28.8 – – –
Solomon Islands 15.6 12.1 – – –
Vanuatu 9.3 7.4 – – –
Middle income 199 14.5
High income 2,585 –
Source: (1 Calculations based on population figures from World Bank country profiles (see
www.worldbank.org) and World Bank (2000b).
(2 See (1. IMF repurchases and charges and short-term debt obligations are not included in
this figure.
(3 World Bank (2000a: 90-2).
(4 World Bank (2000a: 70-2 and 252-4).9
Cambodia, whose outstanding debt service in 1999 amounted to US$ 12.1 per capita.
While one out of seven children dies before the age of five, the government spent on
average US$ 17 per capita on health per year during 1990-98. This may seem like a
considerable amount compared to some other severely indebted countries, but it is almost
nothing compared to what middle- and high-income countries spent on health in the same
period; US$ 199 and US$ 2,585 per capita annually, respectively.
A perhaps less obvious effect of the debt burden on development is the fact that high
levels of debt scare off foreign as well as domestic private investors (the so-called debt
overhang effect). As is pointed out in the UNCTAD’s ‘Least Developed Countries 2000
Report’, LDCs exhibit a high degree of vulnerability to external shocks and they are
highly dependent on external financial resources. The government has limited control
over its own finances: its income depends to a large degree on tax revenues related to raw
material exports and spending is conditioned by aid flows and debt service requirements.
The unpredictability of debt service obligations discourages private investors:
[What fraction of scheduled debt payments will be serviced] is the subject of
constant negotiations between the authorities in the indebted countries and
various categories of creditors and entails both formal rescheduling and debt
forgiveness as well as the informal and disorderly accumulation of arrears
[…] It is axiomatic that a basic condition for a flourishing private sector is a
policy environment in which there are simple rules as well as safeguards
against frequent and predictable alteration of the rules. But this is far from the
case with regard to the negotiation of debt service which must be paid
(UNCTAD 2000: 91).
Furthermore, debt affects the level of development through the diversion of aid, or, as
UNCTAD formulates, throughout the 1990s ‘the debt tail has been wagging the aid dog’
(2000: 121). Evidence demonstrates that ‘both official and multilateral disbursements are
highly correlated with total debt service, and multilateral disbursements are highly
correlated with multilateral debt service’. Countries with high debt service obligations
receive relatively more official finance than other countries, mainly because creditors
want to maintain positive net transfers and want to prevent the countries from going
bankrupt and defaulting on their loans.
2.4 Debt in LDCs
In 1998, the total debt stock of LDCs amounted to US$ 154 billion. This is almost four
times as high as the LDCs’ debt stock in 1980. For every single LDC, the debt stock
shows a steady and significant increase since 1980. The majority of the total debt stock is
owed by the 31 HIPC-LDCs. Their share is 85 per cent or US$ 129 billion of the total
LDC debt.
A few LDCs, such as Mozambique, Angola and the Solomon Islands, owe a significant
amount of debt to commercial banks and other private creditors. But for the majority of
LDCs, the main part of the total debt stock consists of official debt, i.e. bilateral debt
owed to governments and multilateral debt owed to multilateral financial institutions. In
1998, 40 per cent of the LDC debt stock was multilateral debt and 38 per cent bilateral
debt. The remaining 22 per cent included private debt and related interest arrears as well
as short-term official debt, plus interest arrears.10
Table 2
LDC debt stock








1980 1990 1998 1998 1998 1998
HIPC-LDCs
Benin 424 1,292 1,647 62 32 5
Burkina Faso 330 834 1399 86 9 3
Burundi 166 907 1,119 84 14 5
C. A. R 195 699 921 70 21 17
Chad 284 524 1091 80 16 4
Congo, D. R. 4,770 10,270 12,929 21 45 64
Ethiopia 824 8,634 10,352 26 64 56
Gambia, The 137 369 477 77 20 0
Guinea 1,134 2,476 3,546 51 40 16
Guinea-Bissau 140 692 964 44 48 26
Lao P. D. R. 350 1,768 2,437 42 58 0
Liberia 686 1,849 2,103 35 23 78
Madagascar 1,250 3,701 4,394 42 52 17
Malawi 830 1,558 2,444 86 12 2
Mali 727 2,467 3,202 55 39 22
Mauritania 840 2,096 2,589 43 46 19
Mozambique 4,653 5,130 26 46 19
Myanmar 1500 4,695 5680 21 59 36
Niger 863 1,726 1,659 63 29 6
Rwanda 190 712 1,226 83 13 6
Sao Tome e Principe 24 150 246 66 29 14
Sierra Leone 469 1,151 1,243 57 33 4
Senegal 1,473 3,723 3,861 58 34 1
Somalia 660 2,370 2,635 34 42 68
Sudan 5,177 14,762 16,843 17 33 80
U. R. Tanzania 5,322 6,438 7,603 45 40 24
Togo 1,049 1,275 1,448 62 35 2
Uganda 689 2,583 3,935 72 23 7
Zambia 3,244 6,916 6,865 50 43 13
Angola – 8,594 12,173 2 24 22
Yemen 1,684 6,345 4,138 45 46 18
Non HIPC-LDCs
Bangladesh 4,230 12,769 16,376 67 31 0
Bhutan – 84 120 68 32 0
Cambodia – 1,854 2,210 16 82 43
Cape Verde – 135 244 74 19 10
Comoros Islands 44 185 203 80 14 22
Djibouti 32 205 288 53 41 9
Equatorial Guinea 76 241 306 36 34 45
Eritrea – – 149 51 46 0
Haiti 302 889 1,048 83 14 0
Lesotho 72 396 692 75 15 2
Maldives 26 78 180 63 19 0
Nepal 205 1,640 2,646 85 12 0
Samoa 60 92 180 80 5 0
Solomon Islands 19 121 152 60 8 5
Vanuatu 4 40 63 70 16 0
Total HIPC-LDCs 35,430 106,714 129,378 36 39 34
Total non HIPC-LDCs 5,070 18,728 24,857 65 32 5
Total LDCs 40,499 125,443 154,235 40 38 30
Note: The non HIPC-LDCs (Afghanistan, Kiribati and Tuvalu) are not included due to lack of data.
Source:World Bank (2000b).11
Table 3
LDC debt indicators, 1980-98
Debt stock/GNP (%) Debt stock/exports (%) Debt servicing/exports (%)
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998 1989 1990 1998
HIPC-LDCs
Benin 30 72 72 107 233 287 5 7 11
Burkina Faso 20 30 55 63 129 343 4 5 13
Burundi – 81 119 – 929 1,819 – 43 49
C. A. R 24 48 89 95 317 633 5 13 21
Chad 27 30 66 398 191 327 8 4 11
Congo, D. R. 33 120 208 198 398 777 23 14 1
Ethiopia – 127 160 140 1,276 984 8 35 11
Gambia, The 58 127 117 206 218 178 6 22 10
Guinea – 95 102 294 432 – 20 19
Guinea-Bissau – 297 504 – 2463 3,131 – 30 26
Lao P. D. R. – 205 199 – 1,690 493 – 9 6
L i b e r i a ––– ––– –––
Madagascar 31 126 120 241 749 515 20 45 15
Malawi 73 89 138 264 344 430 28 29 15
Mali 41 103 128 191 376 376 4 10 10
Mauritania 108 195 273 299 418 648 17 29 28
Mozambique 197 289 223 1,552 1,418 1,414 26 23 18
Myanmar – – – 270 703 326 25 9 5
Niger 35 71 82 132 298 492 22 17 18
Rwanda 16 28 61 103 473 982 4 14 17
Sao Tome e Principe – 334 685 98 1,807 2,119 5 34 32
Sierra Leone 40 144 198 170 547 1,109 24 10 18
Senegal 51 68 83 150 217 278 27 19 23
Somalia 110 284 – 207 3,362 – 4 15 –
Sudan 69 117 183 396 1,849 2,695 20 6 10
U. R. Tanzania – 161 94 699 1,183 645 21 33 21
Togo 96 80 97 178 170 205 9 11 6
Uganda 56 61 58 208 1,051 582 17 60 24
Zambia 90 230 217 200 508 601 25 15 18
Angola – 105 297 – 215 310 – 8 34
Yemen – 135 105 – 139 217 – 4 7
Non HIPC-LDCs
Bangladesh 24 42 37 309 366 182 20 23 8
Bhutan – 31 32 – 88 76 – 6 6
Cambodia – 166 78 – – 259 – – 2
Cape Verde – 40 50 – 77 92 – 3 7
Comoros Islands 36 74 103 254 319 590 2 2 18
D j i b o u t i ––– ––– –––
Equatorial Guinea – 195 76 – 570 73 – 12 1
E r i t r e a – –2 0 – –3 9 – – 1
Haiti 21 30 – 58 274 219 5 10 8
Lesotho 11 39 65 20 71 114 2 4 8
M a l d i v e s –6 05 8 4 04 24 1 1 5 3
Nepal 10 44 54 85 313 193 3 14 6
Samoa – 61 102 95 67 107 9 4 3
Solomon Islands 18 58 52 23 123 77 0 12 3
Vanuatu 4 25 28 – 34 33 – 2 1
Note: The non HIPC-LDCs (Afghanistan, Kiribati and Tuvalu) are not included due to lack of data.
Source: World Bank (2000b).12
Table 4
LDC debt service
Total debt service, 1980-98
(US$ million) Multilateral (%) Bilateral (%)
1980 1990 1998 1998 1998
HIPC-LDCs
Benin 20 38 61 56 36
Burkina Faso 22 34 53 77 15
Burundi 9 42 30 93 3
C. A. R 10 29 30 96 1
Chad 6 12 36 86 11
Congo, D. R. 542 348 19 5 0
Ethiopia 45 236 119 71 19
Gambia, The 4 38 26 62 35
Guinea 109 169 159 60 22
Guinea-Bissau 5 8 8 63 32
Lao P. D. R. 3 9 31 61 39
Liberia 54 3 1 100 0
Madagascar 104 223 125 55 42
Malawi 87 133 84 89 8
Mali 16 67 82 65 26
Mauritania 48 146 110 58 31
Mozambique 79 105 58 25
Myanmar 141 60 93 3 56
Niger 141 99 62 50 10
Rwanda 8 21 21 81 10
S a oT o m eeP r i n c i p e 1 3 4 7 3 1 9
Sierra Leone 259 325 323 52 37
Senegal 66 21 20 75 25
Somalia 13 11 0 0 0
Sudan 264 50 61 100 0
U. R. Tanzania 161 179 246 57 33
Togo 52 86 40 65 30
Uganda 57 147 160 79 16
Zambia 410 202 202 46 21
Angola – 326 1,353 0 7
Yemen 73 169 125 75 19
Non HIPC-LDCs
Afghanistan – – – – –
Bangladesh 278 791 683 48 47
Bhutan – 5 9 18 55
Cambodia – 30 13 31 31
Cape Verde – 6 19 48 42
Comoros Islands 0 1 6 54 45
Djibouti 4 15 6 62 31
Equatorial Guinea 3 5 6 73 0
Eritrea – – 6 16 79
Haiti 26 33 39 77 18
Kiribati – – – – –
Lesotho 6 24 51 58 26
Maldives 1 9 14 22 36
Nepal 8 71 88 58 23
Samoa 6 6 5 76 8
Solomon Islands 0 12 7 74 17
Tuvalu – – – – –
Vanuatu 1 2 2 29 35
Total HIPC-LDCs 2,730 3,313 3,789 39 19
Total non HIPC-
LDCs
331 1,009 951 50 41
Total LDCs 3,061 4,322 4,740 41 24
Note: The non HIPC-LDCs (Afghanistan, Kiribati and Tuvalu) are not included due to lack of data.13
Source: World Bank (2000b).
Like absolute debt stock figures, debt stock indicators have worsened for most HIPC-
LDCs since 1980. As a result of rising debt levels, the present values of debt-to-exports
ratio and of the debt-to-GNP ratio have increased since 1980 for most HIPC-LDCs,
even though exports and GNP show some modest growth (see Table 3). However, for a
number of HIPC-LDCs, debt stock indicators improved between 1980-98.6 Compared
to the performance of other HIPC-LDCs, these countries’ GNP and export income have
improved significantly between 1980 and 1998 (see Annex 1). In other words, the
improved debt indicators are to be attributed to improved economic performance rather
than lower absolute levels of debt. In spite of this, however, these countries’ debts still
remain far above the conservative World Bank and IMF sustainability threshold of a
150 per cent present value of debt-to-export ratio, as is the case for all the HIPC-LDCs.
Also, for 23 out of 28 HIPC-LDCs for which data are available, the present value of
debt-to-GNP ratio is above 80 per cent, the threshold used by the World Bank in the
past to classify a country as ‘severely indebted’.
The group of non HIPC-LDCs shows major differences in the level as well as the
evolvement of debt indicators. Five out of 14 non HIPC-LDCs for which 1998 data are
available, have a debt level that exceeds the 150 per cent present value of debt-to-export
threshold.7 In one more country, Samoa, the present value of debt-to-GNP exceeds 80
per cent. Furthermore, for seven out of the 14 non HIPC-LDCs for which data are
available, debt indicators are worse in 1998 than in the 1980 and 1990 levels, even
though GNP and exports have increased compared to 1980. The debt indicators have
improved for only two countries, Cambodia and former HIPC Equatorial Guinea.
However, Cambodia’s present value of debt-to-export ratio is still far above the 150 per
cent threshold.
In addition to these debt indicators, the amount of arrears is indicative of the severity of
the debt burden. Table 2 gives details on the arrears as a percentage of the total debt
stock for all LDCs. Besides D. R. Congo, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, the countries
well-known for their arrears problems, a large number of other LDCs have huge arrears.
Nine LDCs have arrears of over 20 per cent of their total debt stock, and in the case of
six more LDCs, they amount to more than 15 per cent of the debt stock. There are three
non HIPC-LDCs for which arrears are extremely high: Cambodia (43 per cent),
Comoros Islands (22 per cent), and Equatorial Guinea (45 per cent).
The amount of arrears clearly demonstrates that many LDCs are incapable of paying
their debt service obligations. For at least 18 LDCs, including four non HIPC-LDCs,
annual debt repayments decreased in 1998 compared to 1990, even though the debt
stock increased. The repayments made by LDCs during 1980-98 are given in Table 4. In
1998, these countries returned a total of US$ 4,740 million to foreign creditors. HIPC-
LDCs account for 80 per cent of this total. The main receivers of LDC debt repayments
are multilateral creditors.
6 These are Lao, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mali (only the present value of debt-to-GNP indicator),
Myanmar, Tanzania and Uganda.
7 Bangladesh, Cambodia, Comoros Islands, Haiti, and Nepal.14
As Table 3 demonstrates, assuming a 10-15 per cent debt-service-to-export threshold
range implies that most HIPC-LDCs as well as one non HIPC-LDCs (Comoros Islands)
have unsustainable debts.
It is clear that in addition to the 31 HIPC-LDCs, also many LDCs have unsustainable
debts, even with the rather arbitrary and narrowly defined definition of the World Bank
and IMF. Six non HIPC-LDCs have debt levels that exceed the WB and IMF debt
sustainability thresholds: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Comoros Islands, Haiti, Nepal, and
Samoa. Furthermore, the Equatorial Guinea’s amount of arrears equally suggests that
this country is unable to carry its debt burden.
3 The HIPC exit strategy
Many LDCs have been forced to enter a seemingly endless cycle of debt restructurings,
which, up to the year 2000, has not brought these countries to a sustainable debt level.
The severity of today’s debt burden demonstrates how disappointingly inadequate
official creditors’ response has been in the past to the debt crisis.8 Or, as UNCTAD puts
it: ‘There has been a persistent tendency to underestimate what has been needed, which
has in itself contributed to the build up of the debt’ (2000: 139). Attempts to
significantly reduce the burden of bilateral debt through Paris Club debt negotiations9
have failed, mainly because of the exclusion of large part of the debt, as the well-known
case of Uganda demonstrates. In 1995 Uganda received a 67 per cent stock reduction,
but mainly because previously rescheduled debt was excluded, its US$ 3.2 billion debt
stock only decreased by 3.2 per cent.10
Furthermore, for a long time, the multilateral debt problem was not even taken
seriously. Even though the main part of the poorest countries’ debt repayments went to
multilateral creditors, the World Bank and IMF denied for many years that there was a
multilateral debt problem. It was only in 1996 that the two Bretton Woods institutions
openly acknowledged this, when these introduced the so-called HIPC Initiative.
3.1 The HIPC Initiative
The HIPC Initiative was unique, not only because creditors acknowledged the problem
of multilateral debt for the first time, but also because it was the first comprehensive
attempt to deal with the debt crisis. The initiative involved commercial, bilateral, and
multilateral creditors. The primary aim was to reduce a country’s debt burden so that it
8 As noted in section 2, the main part of LDC debt is official debt, not commercial debt.
9 Before the HIPC Initiative, the latest terms for bilateral debt reduction in the Paris Club were the
Naples Terms. In the Naples flow rescheduling, the NPV of eligible debt service is reduced up to 67
per cent. In the Naples Terms stock-of-debt operation, the total NPV of debt is reduced by 67 per cent.
In order to achieve the required NPV reduction, creditors can choose from a list of options, including
cancellation of principal repayments, cancellation of interest payments, increased concessionality or a
longer time-frame for repayment. Only debt incurred before the ‘cutoff date’ (when a country first
visited the Paris Club for a rescheduling) is eligible for Paris Club operations.
10 See, for example, Eurodad (1996: 12).15
would be sustainable, broadly meaning that a country could permanently exit from the
rescheduling process (see also section 2.1).
It soon became apparent that the original initiative11 failed to reduce debt service
burdens. For instance, for Mali and Burkina Faso, debt service due after the HIPC
programme would actually have been higher than debt service paid before the initiative.
Creditors have recognized some of the original initiative’s flaws and introduced a
number of changes, culminating in the ‘enhanced initiative’, or HIPC II Initiative. This
initiative was agreed by the G7 in June 1999.
3.1.1 Which countries
There are 41 HIPCs, including 31 HIPC-LDCs, which meet the three criteria to qualify
for the enhanced initiative. These criteria are (i) a country is only eligible for highly
concessional assistance (IDA); (ii) it has an IMF poverty reduction and growth facility
supported-programme12 (PRGF) in place; and (iii) it has agreed to a rescheduling of
debts on concessional terms with the Paris Club.
3.1.2 The first stage
The initiative is divided in two stages. During the first stage, the country establishes a
three-year track record of good performance on IMF and World Bank-supported
structural adjustment programmes, of which one year immediately precedes the decision
point.13 The previous track record is taken into account. Just as in the original initiative,
Paris Club creditors provide debt service rescheduling according to the Naples Terms.
The major important difference compared to the first initiative is that countries must
prepare a participatory poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP)14 during this first stage.
Thus, the objective of poverty reduction has been made an integrated part of the
process.
11 The original initiative worked as follows. To enter the initiative, countries would have to: (i) be IDA-
only borrowers; (ii) have gone to the Paris Club for a debt rescheduling on concessional terms, and
(iii) have an IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme in place. If these conditions were met,
a country could enter the first three-year phase, during which it could receive a 67 per cent reduction
of commercial and bilateral debt service. At the end of this phase, the country could receive a 67 per
cent debt stock reduction, or, if this did not lead to a sustainable debt level, opt to continue with the
second three-year phase. During the first and second phases, the country had to implement a World
Bank and IMF supported programme. During the second phase, commercial and bilateral debt service
reduction would be topped up to 90 per cent and at the end of this phase, countries could receive up to
80 per cent bilateral and commercial debt stock reduction. Only if this could not bring the debt to a
sustainable level, multilateral creditors would provide additional debt relief.
12 PRGF has replaced the IMF’s Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
13 In a few cases, the World Bank and IMF have been flexible on the length of the overall track record
(for example in the case of Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe) and the one-year immediate
track record (for example in the case of Niger).
14 For countries which had already reached decision point/completion point in the original HIPC
Initiative, and thus needed to be considered as ‘retroactive cases’ eligible for further debt relief (or for
a few other countries that were already far advanced in the first stage of the HIPC Initiative when the
PRSP approach was introduced, and would have been eligible for a decision point by the end of
2000), an ‘interim PRSP’ is be sufficient to achieve the decision point. It is intended to be a ‘light’
version of a full participatory PRSP, for countries where there is already an existing track record of
successful reform, in order to facilitate faster progress to decision point.16
3.1.3 The decision point
At the end of the first stage, the country reaches the decision point. Similar to the
original initiative, the World Bank and IMF prepare a debt sustainability analysis (DSA)
and calculate whether a Paris Club stock-of-debt operation is sufficient to bring the debt
to a sustainable level. The threshold levels to define debt sustainability, however, have
changed somewhat (see Table 5).
If a Paris Club stock-of-debt operation is not sufficient for achieving a sustainable debt
level, the country can go on to the second stage. At this point, all creditors commit
themselves to delivering a certain amount of debt relief at the completion point.15
Table 5
Debt sustainability threshold levels
HIPC I HIPC II
NPV debt-to-exports 200-250% 150%








Debt service-to-exports 20-25% 10-15%
3.1.4 The second stage
The second stage has changed considerably in comparison to the original initiative:
- The country must implement the PRSP. The duration of the second phase depends on
when certain PRSP targets, set out in the decision point document (DPD), are
achieved. It is expected that this will take at least one year, and in many countries
significantly longer. Thus, the phase is no longer fixed to three years, and the country
moves towards a ‘floating’ completion point.
- World Bank and IMF provide ‘front-loaded’ interim debt service reduction, instead
of providing IDA grants rather than IDA-credits, as proposed in the original
initiative.
- Other multilateral and bilateral creditors provide interim debt service reduction. Paris
Club creditors offer flow rescheduling involving NPV reduction of up to 90 per cent
(instead of the original 80 per cent) on eligible debt.
- The amount of debt stock to be irrevocably cancelled at the completion point is set
by actual debt indicators at the decision point, not on projections of where they will
be at the completion point. However, no automatic reassessment of debt relief is
required when completion point is actually reached.
15 The amount of debt reduction required to reach the relevant debt sustainability threshold target.17
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Decision point due after 2000 (11)
3.1.5 The completion point
When a country reaches the completion point, creditors deliver the debt relief agreed at
the decision point, minus the interim assistance delivered in the second stage. Paris Club
creditors have agreed to offer up to 90 per cent stock of debt relief. Some creditors have
announced their intention to go beyond this unilaterally and cancel up to 100 per cent of
export credits,16 including post-cutoff date debts. Countries must seek equivalent
treatment from non-Paris Club bilateral and commercial creditors. Multilaterals deliver
additional debt relief so that countries reach debt sustainability targets.
16 ODA debt is cancelled outside the auspices of the Paris Club. Many countries have announced their
intention to cancel 100 per cent of ODA debts.18
3.2 An exit from the rescheduling process for LDCs
Until now, seventeen out of a total of 31 HIPC-LDCs have reached their decision point.
One of these, Uganda, has passed the completion point. Eleven other HIPC-LDCs will
reach their decision point in the future. Of these eleven nations, only the Central African
Republic and Chad have an IMF programme in place. The others are conflict-affected
countries, which are unlikely to qualify for the initiative in the foreseeable future. Since
1998, the World Bank and IMF have been exploring proposals to give special support to
these countries to help them to qualify for the initiative (see Box 2). However, mainly
due to lack of finance and required bilateral donor cooperation, these proposals have
hardly been materialized.
Two HIPC-LDCs, Angola and Yemen, are considered to have a sustainable debt burden
and Lao P. D. R. is not seeking debt relief.
Table 6
Debt r e l i e fc o m m i t t e du n d e rt h eH I P CI n i t i a t i v et o1 7H I P C - L D C s
NPV reduction Nominal debt service relief
(US$ million) (US$ million)
Benin 265 460
Burkina Faso 398 700
Gambia, The 67 90
Guinea 545 800














Source: World Bank (2001b).
As Table 6 indicates, total debt relief committed under the enhanced HIPC Initiative
seems considerable. Total nominal debt service reduction for all 17 HIPC-LDCs that
have reached their decision point amounts to US$ 23,140 million. The total NPV of the
seventeen countries’ debt stock decreases by US$ 13,349 million. In 2018, debt
sustainability indicators are above the threshold levels (see Annex 3). Based on this, one
might conclude that HIPC LDCs indeed are offered an exit from the rescheduling
process. Section 3.4 addresses the question whether the HIPC Initiative offers such an
exit. First, however, this paper examines to what extent the initiative releases resources
for spending on human and social development.19
Box 2
Special support for post-conflict HIPCs
The staffs of the World Bank and IMF recognize that for post-conflict countries(1, ‘early access to
debt-relief may be a critical component of the successful transition to peace and resumption of
sustainable development’. From 1998 onwards, proposals for special support to these countries have
been developed, in which the World Bank has taken the lead. The main problem is that these
proposals require significant donor support, which thus far has not been forthcoming.
Helping post-conflict countries to qualify for the HIPC Initiative
How do the World Bank and IMF propose to help post-conflict countries? First of all, by helping them
to qualify for the HIPC Initiative, through (i) giving technical support that helps these countries to build
a track record and (ii) flexibility regarding several aspects of the HIPC Initiative (such as for example
the length and content of the track record required to qualify for the initiative, the I-PRSP, the timing
of the decision point).
Currently, the World Bank and IMF have limited possibilities to finance technical support to conflict-
affected countries. Most countries cannot receive 'normal' support, as both the Bank and the Fund
cannot issue new loans to countries that are in arrears. Since 1995, the IMF can give special support
through 'emergency post-conflict assistance': loans that help the country to become eligible for PRGF
assistance. This assistance is non-concessional, which could be compensated for by bilateral
interest subsidies. However, thus far these have hardly been forthcoming. The IMF staff recognizes
that additional resources are needed to finance support to post-conflict countries. Bank and Fund
propose that to this end, the IMF seeks 'support from the international community'.
The World Bank has several options to finance support, including grants from IBRD net income,
donor supported-country specific trust funds, and grants from the post-conflict fund. Since 1999, the
Bank can also provide limited IDA grant financing to countries in arrears, but only in situations where
all creditors allow arrears accumulation and where a country has made 'convincing steps towards
social and economic recovery'. Considering these conditions, it is not surprising that no country has
thus far qualified. The World Bank acknowledges that it 'is now not well positioned to provide
adequate support to post-conflict countries in arrears' and that it needs 'expanded access to grant
resources'. World Bank staff now proposes that the Bank explores the possibility to scale up the post-
conflict fund and the possibility to broaden the scope of IDA-grants.
Arrears clearance
Secondly, the IMF and World Bank staffs propose to help post-conflict countries by 'arrears
clearance'. Bank and Fund could help the country to prepare an 'arrears clearance plan'. Arrears
clearance can only take place (i) after the country has established a satisfactory track record of policy
performance (which is expected to take 1-3 years and to coincide largely with the track record
required to qualify for the HIPC Initiative) and (ii) 'within a framework of concerted international
action'.
Arrears to the IMF are to be cleared as they are now: through a bridge loan provided by bilateral
creditors. The World Bank currently also relies on bilateral donor contributions to clear arrears.
Proposals for other mechanisms, the first of which were put forward in 1998, have not been accepted
by the World Bank Board. These include: (i) arrears accumulation in the pre-arrears clearance
period; (ii) rescheduling and/or refinancing of arrears to IDA; (iii) Fifth Dimension type credits to
ensure positive net transfers to finance reconstruction efforts after arrears clearance. The staff now
proposes that the use of these special mechanisms could be decided on a case-by-case basis.
(1 Post-conflict is a situation where a conflict which prevented a return to a functioning peace-time
economy without international assistance has subsided to a degree to which international
assistance is both possible and sustainable. Conflict-affected HIPCs include HIPC eligible
countries that either currently are in conflict or have been in conflict in the past few years: Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, D. R. Congo, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan
Sources: World Bank (2001a); Eurodad (1998).20
Table 7
Savings on debt service and increases in social spending for seventeen HIPC-LCDs, 1999-2002
1999 2000 2001 2002
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Notes: (1 Savings on debt service: debt service due after the HIPC Initiative in 2000-02 compared to
annual debt service paid in 1998-99. The figure for 1998/99 is what has been paid, figures
for 2000-02 indicate savings. The figure for 2000 takes into account the debt relief provided
under the original framework and the relief provided to those countries that reached their
decision points under the enhanced framework during the first half of 2000.
(2 Difference compared to 1999 given in brackets.
Source: World Bank (2001b).21
3.3 Increased spending on social development
It is impossible to indicate to what extent decreased debt service requirements
contribute directly to additional spending on social and human development.17 First of
all, it is difficult to estimate how many resources are actually freed thanks to debt relief,
particularly since many HIPC-LDCs in the past did not pay all of the outstanding debt
service. In addition, two countries—Niger and Zambia—will pay more debt service in
the years 2001-05 than they did in 1998-99, implying that no funds are freed at all.
Second, increased social spending cannot be related directly to decreased debt service.
HIPC-LDCs have always borrowed money to pay part of their debt service.
Consequently, it is impossible to increase spending on social and human development
with the same amount as the debt service is lowered without new borrowing or grants.
Increases in spending on social and human development cannot therefore be attributed
solely to debt service relief, but must also be attributed to new grants and loans.
The fact that there is no straightforward relation between decreased debt service levels
and increased spending on social development is illustrated by Table 7. For instance, for a
number of countries, increased spending on social services in 2001-02 is much higher
than the amount of resources ‘freed’ by debt relief.18 Furthermore, for Zambia and Niger,
whose debt service due after 2000 will increase compared to that paid in 1998, spending
on social development will nonetheless increase after 2000.
3.4 Flaws
At first sight, the HIPC Initiative seems promising. However, a closer look at the data
shows that if the initiative is to fulfil even its limited aim of an exit from the
rescheduling process, much deeper debt reduction is needed.
3.4.1 Heavily indebted and poor but not a HIPC
First of all, several LDCs with significant debt burdens are not included in the initiative.
For instance, Angola is considered to have a sustainable debt burden, even though all its
1998 debt indicators are above the threshold level and Angola’s arrears almost
quadrupled from US$ 700 million (or 8 per cent of total debt) in 1990 to US$ 2,704
million (22 per cent of total debt) in 1998.
Furthermore, there are seven LDCs that do not meet the criteria to be designated a HIPC
but which do have unsustainable debts according to the rather conservative World Bank
and IMF criteria (see section 2). These countries are not even considered for the
initiative, even though they are heavily indebted and extremely poor. For example, in
Bangladesh, 30 per cent of the population lives below US$ 1 per day, and 78 per cent
17 It is even more difficult to indicate to what extent debt reduction contributes to the realization of
reduced poverty rates. As pointed out by UNCTAD, ‘There is a large gap between more social
expenditures and the realization of better social outcomes and reduced poverty rates. There are major
problems of reaching the poor through social spending, and even if this is successful, long-term
poverty reduction depends on economic growth and the expansion of employment opportunities and
productivity per worker. Channelling small amounts of HIPC assistance into social spending is more
likely to provide short-term poverty relief than long-term poverty reduction’ (2000: 160).
18 For instance, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda.22
below US$ 2. In Nepal, these percentages are 38 per cent and 82 per cent, respectively.
According to UNCTAD, if current trends persist, it will take Bangladesh 25-50 years
and Cambodia and Nepal 50-100 years to reach US$ 900 per capita income levels;
growth in several other LDCs, including Angola, Comoros, and Haiti, is negative or
stagnant (UNCTAD 2000: 13, 27).
Table 8
Future debt service payments for seventeen HIPC-LDCs
Before HIPC II After HIPC II
Av. 1998-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2010 2015 2018
B e n i n 6 5 6 3 4 64 33 93 93 74 47 38 9
B u r k i n a F a s o 5 6 3 4 3 03 53 84 04 15 58 3 –
Gambia, The (1 21 20 16 15 8 9 10 19 23 30
Guinea 118 140 78 90 99 92 88
G u i n e a B i s s a u 2 1 2 9 66884 1 1––
Madagascar 136 105 64 56 68 79 82
Malawi 88 110 59 57 45 45 47 55 86 92
Mali 79 88 64 64 66 67 66 76 125 144
Mauritania 93 87 80 58 49 43 43
Mozambique (2 92 50 48 51 54 55 60 97 98 111
Niger 27 94 49 49 26 29 29 26 35 48
Rwanda (3 17 40 16 13 8 11 11 15 28 42
S a o T o m e e P r i n c i p e 9 6 21111334
Senegal (4 220 173 159 145 143 225 134 114 114 114
Tanzania (5 208 154 142 144 148 152 158 258 258 258
Uganda 104 48 51 56 68 94 103
Zambia (6 141 169 158 148 151 211 202 135 109 135
Notes: (1 Last two columns for the Gambia represent data for the years 2014 and 2019.
(2 Last column for Mozambique represents data for the year 2017.
(3 Last three columns for Rwanda represent data for the years 2009, 2014 and 2019.
(4 Data for 2001-05 in the March 1 World Bank document are: 159, 145, 143, 225, 134. Data
for the years 2010, 2015, and 2018 data are the average data for 2009-18.
(5 Data for the years 2010, 2015 and 2018 are the average for 2010-18.
(6 The average for 1993-98 excludes debt service data for 1995, as 1995 debt service is seven
times higher (US$ 2,623 million) than the average for this period. If this figure is included,
t h ea v e r a g ew o u l db eU S $6 7 7m i l l i o n .
Source: Decision Point Documents (available at: www.imf.org).
3.4.2 Too little
Second, the debt reduction offered is likely to be too small. For the majority of HIPC-
LDCs, debt servicing in the short to medium term—up to 2004-05—is indeed lower
compared to what these countries actually paid to their foreign creditors in the period
1993-98 and 1998/9. But for five out of the sixteen HIPC-LDCs for which data are
available, the NPV of debt level in 2005 is still over the IMF and World Bank threshold
ratio of 150 per cent.19
In addition, some countries will see large fluctuations in debt servicing, followed in
most cases by significant drops in the subsequent years. For example, Senegal’s debt
service jumps by 61 per cent in 2004 and Mauritania’s debt service by 46 per cent in
2007. Such ‘humps’ in debt servicing obligations make the budget-planning process
19 These are Burkina Faso (158 per cent), the Gambia (141 per cent), Malawi (169 per cent), Niger (183
per cent), Rwanda (167 per cent).23
very hard for HIPC governments. Furthermore, debt service levels will start to rise
again. For eleven out of the thirteen HIPC-LDCs for which post-2005 debt service data
are available, debt service starts to increase after 2005 and for nine HIPC-LDCs future
levels are far above present debt service levels. Thus, in the long run, most HIPC-LDCs
will be back to where they are now.
The reality that the debt reduction currently on offer may simply not be enough in the
long run is also demonstrated by the fact that eligible countries remain dependent on
new borrowing, as is reflected in the building up of the debt and increasing debt service
levels. As was pointed out by the US General Accounting Office, debt reduction only
frees resources if HIPCs continue to borrow at the same rate as in the past (GAO 2000).
In effect, increased spending on poverty reduction is now being financed by new debt
that will come due in the future. For example, the World Bank is funding HIV/AIDS
programmes with loans rather than grants, despite the fact that these loans will not
generate new productive capacity with which to pay them off.
The fact that in spite of rising absolute debt service levels, the World Bank and IMF
forecast sustainable debt levels in 2018 for all HIPC-LDCs having gone through the
initiative (see Annex 3), is not related to decreasing debt levels, but to improved
economic growth performance. However, as the projections are very optimistic, if not
unrealistic, it is very likely that these countries will fail to live up to the World Bank and
IMF’s expectations on economic growth (see Annex 4). For eligible HIPCs that have
reached the decision point, the average annual real GDP growth rate is projected to
increase from the 3.1 per cent achieved in 1990-99 to 5.6 per cent in 2000-10, and this
high growth rate is expected to be sustained for fifteen years. Also, most projected
export figures are much higher than their ten-year historical averages: the average
export growth in 1990-99 was 4.2 per cent, and the average projected growth for
2000-10 is 8.9 per cent, which implies export performance more than doubling.
There is no reason to expect such an increase in export growth. Actually, there is reason
to think that export earnings will come under increasing pressure in future years. LDCs
and HIPCs export earnings are concentrated in a few primary commodities and most of
these countries depend on just two or three exports. This makes their economies very
vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices, and in recent years commodity prices
have fallen sharply. Furthermore, no account is taken of the likelihood that, as many
countries increase export production in the absence of a simultaneous upswing in world
demand, market response will drive prices down. In terms of aggregate global demand,
there is likely to be increased downside risk, as the US economy, the motor of global
demand, appears to be slowing down.
In addition, with regard to other macroeconomic variables, a ‘relatively neutral external
environment’ is assumed. However, the economies of LDCs and HIPCs are very
vulnerable because of the volatility of global commodity prices, and several other
factors, including:
- Fluctuations in import prices, such as the oil price;
- Exchange rate devaluations and their impact on import prices;
- The level of donor aid flows (which is assumed to increase significantly); and24
- The occurrence of non-economic shocks, such as climatic shocks, wars, or social
conflicts, but also ‘slow-moving’ shocks, such as the AIDS/HIV pandemic.
Another reason why the amount of debt reduction being offered in the end is inadequate
is that Paris Club creditors have not kept the promise they made at the G7 in Cologne in
1999 when they announced that in order to meet the sustainability ratios, they would
cancel pre- and post-cutoff non-aid debt. Reduction of aid debt would be additional to
this, and would therefore reduce the ratio below the thresholds. However, for Uganda,
the first country to reach the completion point, Paris Club creditors failed to come to an
agreement on this. After several months of fruitless debate, it was left to the creditors
themselves to decide which debt they would cancel to reach the required ratio.
Finally, the reduction offered may not be sufficient because domestic debt is not
included in the World Bank and IMF’s debt sustainability analyses, even though some
countries have significant domestic debt burdens. In many LDCs, domestic debt
repayments amount to 20 per cent of the government budget.
Box 3
Crisis response mechanism
Countries dealing with disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods, need maximal
resources for immediate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. In times of great human distress
and need caused by such disasters, it would be almost inhuman to insist on debt repayments.
Therefore, a ‘Stop the Clock’ should be put on all public external debt servicing. Stop the Clock
means that debt payments and interest accruals would be completely frozen for the duration of a
moratorium. During this time, all the country’s resources could then be dedicated to emergency
response and to the additional cost of reconstruction. In general, a two-year moratorium will be
needed, to ensure that the (rural) economy can go through at least one full crop-cycle after the
disaster has struck.
The ‘Stop the Clock’ moratorium means that interest arrears will not be accrued. During the
moratorium period agreed for Honduras and Nicaragua in 1998, interest was being charged on the
missed loan repayments and was capitalised. After the moratorium, both countries owed more to
their foreign creditors than before. Moreover, the multilaterals did not participate in the moratorium.
In the case of Mozambique, the multilaterals did take steps to stop debt servicing during one year.
But this still wasn’t a true ‘Stop the Clock’ mechanism; it is instead a frontloading of debt service,
which has to be ‘caught up’ in the years following.
Source: Eurodad (2000c).
3.4.3 Conditionality and timing
The third major drawback, besides the exclusion of many heavily indebted countries
and inadequate amounts offered for debt reduction, is the complexity of conditionality.
The introduction of the PRSP as a condition for the initiative has brought poverty
reduction to the centre of policy conditionality. However, this not only involves a
change of emphasis, but also an extension of policy conditions. In addition to traditional
macroeconomic and structural reforms, the country must also implement a number of
agreed social development policies.
At the same time as conditionalities pile up, the PRSPs have not succeeded in better
aligning macroeconomic issues and poverty issues than in the past and thus
macroeconomic frameworks have not significantly changed (see Box 3). The European
Union is now in the position to take up the challenge to ensure that the poverty focus is25
Box 4
The poverty reduction strategy paper
The announcement of the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) by the World Bank and the IMF
in September 1999 reflects the institutions’ willingness to put poverty reduction at the centre of their
work in low-income countries. The HIPCs would be the first countries in which PRSPs would be
adopted. In the end, the PRSP would be key to World Bank and IMF concessional lending facilities,
i.e. IDA and PRGF.
The PRSP has four essential features:
i) it lays out a framework and agenda for tackling poverty;
ii) it is comprehensive: macroeconomic, structural, sectoral and social elements are
included, with all policies being consistent with the goal of poverty reduction;
iii) it is developed in a participatory way; and
iv) it is nationally owned.
Eurodad’s ‘PRS-Watch’ programme, which closely follows the formulation of PRSPs, has found that
even though there are many differences between countries' PRS processes, the PRSP concept
cannot be characterized as an overall success or a failure. There are some concerns, which need to
be addressed.
First of all, the link between PRSP and the HIPC Initiative is delaying debt relief and lowering the
quality of PRSs. PRSPs are another layer of conditionality in an already complicated qualification
process for the HIPC Initiative. The interim PRSP does not solve this problem.
Second, the PRSPs do not succeed in aligning macroeconomic issues and poverty issues more
closely than in the past and macroeconomic frameworks have not changed significantly as a result of
PRSPs.
Third, as a result, growth is consistently prioritized as the primary motor of poverty reduction. There
has been little attention to quality aspects of growth, such as equity and distribution. This partly
results from a lack of a definition of what pro-poor growth is. In fact, poverty concerns are not being
placed at the heart of policy-making.
Fourth, to ensure that policies proposed will maximize benefits for the poor, an open, transparent ex-
ante impact assessment is needed. However, there is little evidence of this occurring so far.
Fifth, the World Bank and the IMF remain the final arbiters of PRSPs. The PRSP therefore hardly
involves a change in the relationship between countries and these institutes. Instead of the World
Bank and IMF approving or rejecting a PRSP on an all-or-nothing basis, it would be desirable to see
a national poverty reduction strategy being presented to all donors equally, for example at a UN
roundtable or a World Bank consultative group meeting.
Sixth, although participation is better organized and being taken more seriously by governments than
in the past, proper participation will take significantly longer than in the past (up to five years).
Moreover, there are concerns about the lack of distinction between mere ‘consultation’, where the
views and ideas of civil society are merely solicited, and full participation, where civil society
organizations share in decision-making. The danger is that consultation could serve to rubber-stamp
and legitimize a strategy over which civil society has had no influence.
Seventh, there is little evidence that the PRSP process—particularly because of the rush to get debt
relief—builds on existing processes. On the contrary, existing home-grown processes are being
shouldered aside by the arrival of PRSP. Although some of these existing processes were slow-
moving and inadequate, there are still significant implications for the quality of ownership when these
are not built upon.
Source: Eurodad (2000b).26
included in the design of macroeconomic adjustment measures. The EU will co-finance
the new (IDA) Poverty Reduction Support Credits, which are based on PRSPs.20 The
EU finances the grant part (PRSG) and the World Bank the credit part (PRSC). The
indicators, objectives, timetables and conditionalities for the PRSC and the PRSG are
the same and they are jointly defined. Although the EU assessment will not be included
in the World Bank assessment of the PRS process, it is likely that the EU and the World
Bank have common informal assessments of the PRSP.
Even though the change of emphasis must be welcomed, it cannot be denied that the
piling-up of different sets of conditionalities is delaying the road to the completion
point, at which point countries receive unconditional and irrevocable relief (see also
Box 4). According to the World Bank and IMF, in theory it should take two years to
produce a PRS. However, Uganda has been working on a PRS for five years, and even
after this the Bank and the Fund wanted Uganda to provide some more details on the
cost of poverty reduction programmes and to increase the link between expenditures on
poverty reduction and poverty indicators (UNCTAD 2000: 146).
On the one side, the need to develop and implement a PRS for one year postpones debt
relief, while on the other side the rush to achieve the completion point diminishes the
quality of the PRS. The current linkage is thus damaging both processes and therefore
other ways should be explored to link debt reduction to poverty alleviation. The next
section describes alternative ways to ensure that debt reduction is really linked to social
and human development.
4 The alternative approach
It is likely that the enhanced HIPC Initiative will not even allow countries to reach the
narrowly defined definition of debt sustainability that is limited to financial and
economic indicators, and consequently exit of the rescheduling process. Not all heavily
indebted LDCs are eligible for the initiative, the assistance offered under HIPC II is too
small and the main link between debt reduction and social development, the PRSP,
complicates and delays the HIPC process.
The main problem with the current approach, furthermore, is that debt sustainability is
being confined to economics. There is broad consensus in the international community
that debt needs to be seen in a broader context and that the human development
perspective must be incorporated in the HIPC Initiative. Nevertheless, there has been no
attempt to incorporate human development indicators into the assessment of debt
sustainability itself.
To assess the level of resources needed to achieve debt sustainability and poverty
reduction, debt sustainability must be seen in a broader context that incorporates the
human development needs of the beneficiary countries. This requires a new approach
towards defining debt sustainability, which is described in section 4.1. Furthermore, as
countries are in urgent need of debt relief, HIPC debt reduction and the PRS process
should be made two parallel elements. This is the subject of section 4.2. As much more
20 For 2001 and 2002, nineteen African countries, including sixteen LDCs, are identified for co-
financing opportunities.27
debt reduction will be needed than the amounts currently offered, the question is be:
Which creditors should cancel the debt? And can they afford to do so?
4.1 The human development approach
Based on earlier work of Cafod (1998) and Jubilee 2000, Eurodad supports a new
‘bottom-up’ approach, the ‘affordable debt-service approach.21 The starting point of this
approach is that resources available to LDCs’ governments must first be used for the
essential expenditures needed to fight poverty: clean water, primary health care,
education and basic infrastructure. Once these expenditures are covered, remaining
government revenues can then be spent on other important but less essential items, such
as capital expenditure, civil infrastructure, police, security, domestic debt servicing—
and external debt repayments.
In short, the approach defines how much a country can spend on external debt servicing,
after sufficient investments to social and economic development have been made and
after domestic debt has been serviced. This, of course, will differ for each individual
country. For illustrative purposes, a simple method to calculate the affordable debt
service for LDCs based on a number of general assumptions is described below. It
should be noted that these assumptions are rather conservative and do not realistically
reflect the country-specific situation of each individual LDC.
Box 5
Simple method to calculate affordable debt service
1. Domestic budget revenue
2. Essential spending on poverty reduction –
3. Domestic debt repayments x 20%
4. Net feasible revenue x 20%
5. Affordable debt service
4.1.1 Resources available to the government
The simplest way of calculating the amount of resources available to the government is
to look at current domestic budget revenue data. However, this method has some
important shortcomings. On the one hand, there could be pressure to increase
government revenues in order to increase the funds available for debt servicing. This
could be done by increasing tax rates, which would have negative effects, including
slowing the economy and encouraging capital flight. On the other hand, governments
might be tempted to cut back on their revenue collection efforts in order to qualify for
greater debt relief. This problem could be circumvented with realistic projections of the
country’s potential fiscal revenues.22
21 See Eurodad (2000a).
22 To mention one methodology to do so: A tax threshold is set at the normal international poverty line
of US$ 1 per day (conventionally taken as a dollar/day at purchasing power of 1985 US dollars).28
4.1.2 Essential expenditures on poverty reduction
The first item to come from government revenue is essential spending on poverty
reduction. This amount will differ for each country. In the future, exact data can be
derived from the PRSPs. The Cafod paper sets a basis of US$ 16 per capita on primary
health care and US$ 12 per capita on education and basic infrastructure. The drawback
of this simple approach is that it does not reflect the diversity of poverty-reduction
needs in HIPCs and that is probably too low.23
4.1.3 Domestic debt repayments
For most LDCs, domestic debt repayments amount to 20 per cent of the government
budget. These repayments should be made before external debt is being serviced.
3.1.4 Net feasible revenue
Total expenditures for essential spending and domestic debt servicing are subtracted
from the total government revenue. What remains is ‘net feasible revenue’, available for
important but less essential items, such as capital expenditure, civil infrastructure,
police, security—and external debt servicing. The assumption is that up to 20 per cent
of this remaining money may go to debt servicing. This is quite a generous assumption,
but the analysis tries to be deliberately conservative to give credence to the numbers.
Any debt stock that induces the annual debt servicing costs to exceed the sustainable
level should be cancelled.
4.2 Delinking the HIPC Initiative and the PRSP process
The idea of the PRS process is a valuable one, in which countries in theory are given the
opportunity to develop their own poverty-focused development strategies in a way that
guarantees the participation of all major stakeholders (government, private sector, civil
society and donors). However, Eurodad’s PRS-Watch listserve, which collects and
disseminates information, and the analysis from southern civil society organizations
(CSOs) show that numerous problems are still encountered on the ground.24
The formal linkage between this process and the HIPC Initiative, where HIPCs are
required to produce an interim PRSP to reach decision point and to finalize and start
implementing their PRSP before achieving the completion point, is flawed. This is
because the design and implementation of a participatory and country-owned PRS is a
long process (up to five years), while new resources from debt cancellations are
urgently needed to meet the most basic needs of HIPCs population. The linkage
between the two processes despite these differences in timelags leads to:
Anyone living below this poverty line is held to be unlikely to be contributing any tax at all. For the
better off, tax is paid as normal, but with a tax break of one dollar per day. The rest of GDP is
considered taxable, with a maximum tax rate of 25 per cent (higher rates could be distortionary). This
gives a figure for potential government revenues. Another, simpler method would be to look at recent
fiscal receipts.
23 For instance, the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report estimates that an extra US$ 80 billion
must be spent annually on the 1.3 billion people living in poverty. This is an additional US$ 62
spending for each person living on less than a dollar a day.
24 See www.eurodad.org.29
- Delays in the disbursement of additional resources to the social sectors until full
PRSPs have been produced. This particular setback should be taken very seriously
when one knows that the HIPC Initiative has only managed to reduce the total debt
servicing burden of the HIPCs by 3 per cent during the past four years;
- Countries rushing to complete their PRSPs in order to reach completion point. In the
HIPC Initiative, this rushing greatly undermines the participation of the stakeholders
and the ownership, elements which should be at the heart of the process. It also leads
governments to perceive PRSPs as yet another conditionality imposed by the IFIs on
the long path to irrevocable debt cancellations; and
- Furthermore, PRS documents produced to date have focused exclusively on
long-term structural adjustments and macroeconomic policy frameworks, rather than
setting out exactly how resources freed up by debt reduction will work in practice.
An attempt was made to address this tension by requiring countries to produce only an
interim PRSP in order to reach the decision point and to benefit from interim debt relief.
Unfortunately, these documents have not avoided the tendency for countries to rapidly
produce full PRSPs in order to speed up the progress towards the completion point.
While it is undeniable that the use of the funds freed by debt reduction towards poverty
reduction should be monitored, this should not be done by using PRSP as a condition
for irrevocable debt relief. Instead, PRSP and HIPC should be made parallel processes
to enable countries to reach the completion point even if their PRSPs are not finalized.
This would allow debt relief to proceed quickly without damaging the PRSP process, to
free up some resources for the poverty analysis and the participation aspects required in
the first steps of a PRSP while allowing some basic poverty investments to be
undertaken immediately.
This does not mean that the HIPC Initiative and the PRS process should develop
entirely in isolation from each other. Rather, the link should be defined in terms of the
PRS process providing information on how debt relief resources should be used. The
PRSPs represent a valuable source to diagnosis the extent of poverty, evaluate the
resources needed to implement a poverty reduction strategy and to help coordinate
donors’ aid. But debt reduction should not be held up until countries have implemented
far-reaching structural reforms and economic policies that have nothing to do with how
debt relief resources should be spent on fighting poverty.
Other mechanisms exist that can be used to guarantee that HIPC funds are used for
poverty reduction and additional social expenditures before full PRSPs have been
produced. Poverty funds, such as the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) created in Uganda,
offer one credible solution. Such structures have three main features:
- They are integrated in the national budget so that the expenditures being funded are
included in the overall development/poverty reduction strategy of the country;
- Dedicated disbursement and reporting procedures ensure that the funds allocated to
poverty reduction are truly additional to current expenditures and guarantee the
transparency of the process; and
- The poor are involved in the monitoring of the structure.30
In Uganda, this framework has enabled it to make efficient use of the funds freed by
debt reduction despite the fact that the country was engaged in a war, was highly
corrupted and that no PRSP had yet been approved by the IFIs. Furthermore, the
expenditures programmed through the Poverty Action Fund have had a very significant
impact on social indicators (education doubled in a few years) and the participation of
the different stakeholders (government, civil society organizations, donors) has been by
all accounts significant and fruitful.
Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund is a possible option for reconciling both the demands for
best-practice budget management and for involving the local population in the
monitoring process. The outcome, however, is the product of Uganda’s specific
circumstances and of a larger political process. In this respect, it is not a package simply
to be taken or to be ignored. The main lesson, nevertheless, is that, even in a country
that is not the model of democracy, it is possible, when creating specific mechanisms
linking debt relief with poverty reduction, to avoid problems such as fungibility and
sub-optimal budget management and at the same time to allow monitoring by the local
population, which legitimates the whole process.
4.3 Who should be cancelling unaffordable debts?
Debt reduction under the ‘affordable debt service’ approach will be significantly higher
than what is currently being offered in the HIPC Initiative. The question is, which
creditors should cancel these additional amounts?
For bilateral creditors, cancelling additional debt poses a few financial problems. A
large part of LDC loans are non-performing loans, as indicated by the piling up of
arrears. Writing off a non-performing loan does not cost any new money, it simply
involves accepting that the loaned money will not return. In technical terms, it simply
needs to be recognized that the revenues from the asset is not forthcoming and that total
revenues is lower than expected. Provisions can then be made to reduce the size of the
asset in the creditor’s books. Thus, annual provisions gradually reduce the paper value
of the asset to recognize the decline in the asset’s real value. Once the paper value
reaches zero, the asset has been simply ‘written off’ from the financial accounts.
Only when a performing loan (one that is being repaid) is written off, a real economic
cost is involved,25 i.e., a creditor is deprived of a revenue stream. If these revenues are
re-absorbed into the central treasury, then there is some budgeting impact. When
looking at the overall cost of cancelling a portfolio of bilateral credits, some of which
will be performing and some not, it thus needs to be recognized that the economic cost
is not the same as face value, or nominal value of the loans.
For LDCs, and for HIPC-LDCs in particular, the difference between the nominal and
the market value of their debt is likely to be significant. Building on previous
econometric estimates of the secondary market prices of middle-income countries prior
to the Brady Initiative, a recent academic paper by Cohen (2000) shows that the HIPC
25 Commercial banks have already realized the futility of continuing to hold dud assets in their loan
portfolios. They have written off most of the loans in the 1980s, demonstrating prudent financial
management. Refusing to cancel worthless loans implies that the value of bank assets—and hence the
financial strength of the bank overall—are overstated.31
Initiative, for instance, is about ten times less generous than face value accounting
would suggest. The economic value of LDC debts can also be calculated directly by
using country-specific discount rates. These rates can be derived either from data from
secondary loan swap markets or data from debt buy-back operations.
Some creditors, including the US, the UK and Canada, already budget ‘pro-actively’ for
the prospect of non-repayment of loans. Both Canada and the UK fully budget ODA
loans, which means that they are valued at zero. For non-concessional loans, the value
of the loan is reduced by a country-specific based discount rate. The US also quantifies
the risk of non-repayment of non-concessional loans, but it uses a more general discount
rate.26 By making these provisions, the budgetary impact of non-performing loans is
reduced. For instance, the budgetary cost for a hundred per cent cancellation of
US$ 3.8 billion pre- and post-cutoff date HIPC loans is only US$ 346 million. Indeed,
most Paris Club creditors, particularly the G7, have already moved to cancel 100 per
cent of the debt of HIPCs. These moves should be copied by all Paris Club members,
a n da l s oe x t e n d e dt oL D C s .
But, while these examples highlight that Paris Club creditors have made a lot of
progress in cancelling HIPC-LDC debt, the same, unfortunately, cannot be said for
non-Paris Club bilaterals, who are often significant creditors of LDCs. Under the
burden-sharing clauses of the HIPC Initiative, they are supposed to cancel HIPC debt on
equal terms. However, only a few have agreed to do so. The same applies for some of
the few remaining commercial creditors of HIPCs.
In practice, many HIPCs are heavily in arrears to non-Paris Club creditors, and the Fund
has unofficially condoned these non-payments. However, in order to bring greater
certainty to this process, and to essentially bring about a unilateral write-off of these
non-performing loans (and thus reduce investor perceptions of debt overhang), we
propose that the creditor community (IFIs and Paris Club) should officially condone the
non-payment of debts to those non-Paris Club creditors and commercial creditors that
have refused to participate in the HIPC Initiative. However, there are two potential
exceptions to this rule: first, in cases where non-Paris Club creditors (despite not
respecting their HIPC Initiative obligations) continue to offer a significant amount of
new funds, in particular grants, we argue that debtor countries should pay back their
arrears in order not to jeopardize new flows of funds. At the same time, richer creditors
should increase pressure on these non-Paris Club creditors to follow their lead and
cancel 100 per cent of credits. Second, where creditor countries are poor, rich countries
should help financially to cancel the debt owned to them, possibly through the use of
centralized trust funds.
For multilateral creditors, cancelling loans is a bit more complicated. Multilateral
creditors administer revolving funds of money donated by the shareholders, and have
‘preferred creditor status’, meaning that their loans are serviced more diligently than
those of other creditors. There is a consensus that the IMF can easily write off its debts
to the HIPC countries by using the earning capacity of its general reserves, together
with a repeat of limited revaluation of its undervalued gold reserves. IMF management
has acknowledged this, and simply needs approval from its shareholders. The
26 The discount factor is derived from a proprietary system of country credit ratings that are calculated
by a body called the Inter-Agency Country Risk Assessment System. This system assigns countries
into one of eight risk categories with a specific default rate.32
revaluation of these gold reserves would allow the institution to cancel all its PRGF
credits without any impact on its financial viability, nor on its ability to lend to
low-income countries.
The situation for the Bank is certainly more complicated, yet it is not insoluble. Indeed,
evidence submitted to Drop the Debt by two independent experts commissioned to look
at the question of how resources can be used to fund deeper debt cancellation by the
World Bank and IMF suggests indeed that a hundred per cent cancellation of HIPC debt
by the Bank is not unrealistic (Drop the Debt 2001). With the prudent use of a small
proportion of the IBRD’s reserves and an ongoing commitment from its net income, and
the future use of IDA’s greatly increased reflows (its income from loans made earlier),
more than enough funds can be realized to cancel 100 per cent of the outstanding debts
owed by these poorest countries to the World Bank without affecting its financial
position and IDA lending by any significance. Meanwhile, even if IDA lending were to
be affected, this would not mean, as the Bank sometimes argues, that it will go
bankrupt: there would simply be fewer resources to be loaned out in the future. Whether
this is a good or a bad thing is naturally debatable but the point here is that it is
eminently possible for the Bank to effect total cancellation without threatening its
financial position.
In contrast, other multilateral creditors (which do not generate nearly as much net
income from non-concessional lending as IBRD does) could go bankrupt if they were to
offer hundred per cent debt cancellation. Multilateral development banks (MDBs),
particularly the African Development Bank, are in fact already technically bankrupt and
rely on transfers from donors or on trust funds administered by the World Bank. For
these MDBs to cancel significant amounts of their LDC loans and still stay in business,
additional donor support might be required. Moreover, given the conclusion that the
World Bank can cancel significantly more LDC debt with its own reserves, a far more
significant share of the World Bank HIPC trust fund could be used to cancel the MDBs’
loans.
5 Avoiding future debt crises
One of the reasons why LDCs’ debt has been piling up in the past is irresponsible
borrowing and lending practises. Loans should be productive: resources should be
generated to ensure that the loan can be repaid. Often this is not the case. Think, for
instance, of loans for white elephant projects or for military expenditures, defensive
lending (i.e., loans to refinance debts), but also corruption.
After the HIPC Initiative, LDCs—including the 17 HIPC-LDCs—remain dependent on
large inflows of foreign grants and loans. As explained in section 3.4, it is clear that in
the future, countries that have gone through the HIPC Initiative, still need external
support to finance debt service requirements and to finance poverty reduction. The
World Bank and IMF also recognize this need for continued support:
HIPCs are long-term importers of capital, mainly in the form of official
concessional financing, i.e. concessional loans and grants. Private
transfers and foreign direct investment are typically small. Unless capital33
inflows are non-debt creating, HIPCs will continue to accumulate debts
in order to finance their development efforts (WB/IMF 2001a).
The World Bank and IMF thus also recognize that the type of financing is critical for
the countries’ ability to maintain a sustainable debt situation beyond the completion
point of the HIPC Initiative. To prevent LDCs from falling into the same debt trap as
they are now, much deeper debt relief is needed (as has also been argued in sections 3
and 4), as to make sure that countries do not need new loans to service their debts.
Furthermore, current borrowing and lending practises should changed. A framework is




Corruption is one of the reasons why loans do not generate the necessary resources to repay debts.
Many civil society organizations, particularly those from the South, point out that debts which have
piled up under the rule of corruptive dictatorial and undemocratic governments should be considered
‘illegitimate debts’. People living in these countries now bear the burden of these debts.
For example, Nigeria’s former military regime, largely responsible for the country’s enormous debt
burden, has transferred substantial sums of money to foreign bank accounts. To date, it has not been
possible to transfer this ‘stolen capital’ back to the country.
5.1 Responsible borrowing and lending
At Eurodad’s 1998 Annual Conference in Rome, participants discussed a rather simple
model for the monitoring of borrowing and lending. The model needs to be refined, but
is a good starting point. Key assumptions are that: (i) governments should not borrow
from any source without authority from parliament and (ii) loans should have a
‘productivity conditionality’ incorporated, implying that loans should be used for
productive activities which generate sufficient resources for repayment.
To ensure proper use of external finances, it would be very helpful if the country has
developed a PRS, as monitoring could be linked to the PRS. As defined in the model,
responsible borrowing requires that:
- Internal disbursement of external finances is carried out in an accountable and
transparent manner;
- The use of funding is consistent with the PRS;
- A monitoring system—involving civil society and parliament, similar to the Ugandan
PAF—is put in place to allow for the monitoring of internal disbursement at the
national, regional and local level.34
In addition to responsible use of resources, responsible borrowing and lending requires
that the type of finance is adjusted to its spending purpose. The model makes a
distinction between three different purposes of external finance:
- External finance for non-income generating purposes. This includes humanitarian
and disaster assistance, as well as finance for education and health. Finance for these
non-income generating purposes should take the form of grants. At the very least,
highly concessional loans (IDA) could be used.
- External finance for indirectly income-generating projects. These types of projects
include, for example, the building of roads and other infrastructure development
projects. These programmes should be financed by concessional loans with long
grace periods. Repayments should not fall due before the loan starts to generate
income.
- External finance for directly income-generating projects,s u c ha sf o ri n s t a n c et h e
building of factories. Income-generating projects can be financed by non-
concessional loans. However, there should be a risk assessment by borrowers and
lenders and if the programme fails, both borrowers and lenders should share this risk.
The government of the developing country should not bear the full responsibility, as
is the case now, and be obliged to repay a disproportionate share of the loan.
Moreover, the government should not use money that is earmarked for other sectors,
such as health and education, for the repayment of the loan.
Box 7
Export credit guarantees
When export companies issues a loan to a developing country to enable the country to pay for the
exports, the loan can be guaranteed against the risk of non-repayment by the government of the
exporting country. If the export guarantee is activated, the liability is added to the total stock of official
bilateral debt. While it was first owed to the private sector, the liability thus passes on to the public
sector.
Export credit guarantees bear an ambiguous identity. Export companies can enjoy fully the yields if a
project is successful, but in the event that it is not, they can transfer the losses to the public sector.
The export credit guarantee system encourages exporters to maximize their exports in the
knowledge that they will be bailed out of deals that go bad—at public expense.
Consequently, pricing is being distorted. The financing terms of deals do not reflect the real level of
risks, with the illusion of cheap financing encouraging unnecessary borrowing. Rather than serving
development purposes, export credits guarantees often serve the exporter’s self-interest. This is
combined with a great lack of transparency. Most national export credit agencies operate in a
secretive manner and on neither the creditor nor the debtor side is the public fully aware of the




LDC economic growth indicators, 1980-98
GNP Exports (%)
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
HIPC-LDCs
Benin 1,402 1,806 2,280 395 554 571
Burkina Faso 1,698 2,757 2,569 526 646 408
Burundi 922 1,117 940 – 98 62
C. A. R 800 1,465 1,038 205 220 146
Chad 1,038 1,731 1,666 71 274 334
Congo, D. R. 14,411 8,579 6,210 2,404 2,584 1,664
Ethiopia – 6,788 6,453 591 677 1,053
Gambia, The 237 291 409 66 170 268
Guinea – 2,601 3,476 – 841 822
Guinea–Bissau 104 233 192 – 28 31
Lao P. D. R. – 865 1,224 – 105 494
Liberia 1,093 – – 614 – –
Madagascar 3,996 2,936 3,677 519 494 854
Malawi 1,138 1,760 1,778 315 452 568
Mali 1,768 2,405 2,660 382 656 651
Mauritania 779 1,076 950 281 502 400
Mozambique – 2,366 3,680 – 300 581
Myanmar – – – 556 668 1,745
Niger 2,476 2,423 2,020 655 579 337
Rwanda
S a oT o m eeP r i n c i p e – 4 5 3 6 2 4 8 1 2
Sierra Leone 1,169 800 629 276 210 112
Senegal 2,887 5,502 4,646 980 1,719 1,389
Somalia 603 835 – 319 71 –
Sudan 7,467 12,635 9,220 1,308 799 625
U. R. Tanzania – 4,011 8,063 762 544 1,180
Togo 1,096 1,598 1,487 590 750 706
Uganda 1,240 4,228 6,282 331 246 863
Zambia 3,594 3,008 3,158 1,625 1,362 1,143
Angola – 8,227 4,098 – 4,003 3,930
Yemen – 4,688 3,947 – 4,578 1,906
Non HIPC LDCs
Afghanistan – – – – – –
Bangladesh 17,353 30,524 44,113 1,371 3,492 8,976
Bhutan – 268 373 – 95 157
Cambodia – 1,115 2,845 – – 853
Cape Verde – 341 490 – 175 266
Comoros Islands 124 249 197 17 58 34
Djibouti – – – – – –
Equatorial Guinea – 124 405 – 42 417
Eritrea – – 768 – – 381
Haiti 1,446 2,954 – 522 325 479
Kiribati – – – – – –
Lesotho 632 1,028 1,069 364 555 607
Maldives – 131 310 65 184 435
Nepal 1,958 3,697 4,880 239 524 1,372
Samoa – 151 177 63 137 169
Solomon Islands 108 207 295 85 98 199
T u v a l u ––– –––
Vanuatu – – – – – –
Source: World Bank (2000b).36
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births) 1998 Male Female Primary Secondary
HIPC-LDCs
Benin 53.4 140.0 46.2 77.4 68 28
Burkina Faso 44.2 210.0 68.0 87.4 32 13
Burundi 42.3 196.0 45.2 62.5 36 17
C. A. R 44.4 162.0 42.5 68.3 46 19
Chad 48.5 172.0 51.5 69.4 48 18
Congo, D. R. 50.8 141.0 28.7 52,9 58 37
Ethiopia 42.9 173.0 57.9 69.5 35 25
Gambia, The 53.2 – 58.1 72.5 66 33
Guinea 46.5 184.0 – – 46 15
Guinea-Bissau 43.9 205.0 42.9 82.7 52 24
Lao P. D. R. 53.8 – 38.1 69.8 73 63
Liberia 47.2 187.0 32.8 66.2 – –
Madagascar 57.8 146.0 27.8 42.2 61 –
Malawi 42.3 229.0 26.8 55.9 99 73
Mali 50.4 218 54.2 68.9 38 18
Mauritania 53.7 140.0 48.3 69.0 57 –
Mozambique 45.2 213.0 41.6 73.0 40 22
Myanmar 59.9 118.0 11.3 20.5 99 54
Niger 45.9 250.0 77.6 92.6 24 9
Rwanda 40.8 205.0 28.5 43.2 – –
Sao Tome e Principe 64.3 64.0 – – – –
Sierra Leone 37.3 283.0 – – – –
Senegal 60 20
Somalia 47.6 199.0 – – – –
Sudan 55.3 105.0 32.0 56.6 – –
U. R. Tanzania 47.2 136.0 16.7 35.7 48 –
Togo 48.6 144.0 27.5 61.6 82 58
Uganda 41.8 170.0 23.9 45.8 – –
Zambia 42.6 192.0 16.0 30.9 72 42
Angola 46.5 204.0 – – 35 31
Yemen 55.5 96.0 34.3 77.3 – –
Non HIPC-LDCs
Afghanistan 45.8 – 50.3 80.6 – –
Bangladesh 58.5 96.0 48.9 71.4 75 22
Bhutan 61.1 – – – – –
Cambodia 53.8 143.0 42.6 80.1 100 39
Cape Verde 68.5 67.0 16.3 35.4 – –
Comoros Islands 60.2 88.0 34.5 48.4 – –
Djibouti 49.7 176.0 26.0 48.6 – –
Equatorial Guinea 50.3 171.0 8.6 28.5 – –
Eritrea 50.9 90.0 34.3 61.8 29 38
Haiti 53.6 116.0 49.9 54.4 – –
Kiribati 60.9 – – – – –
Lesotho 55.5 144.0 29.0 7.1 69 73
Maldives 67.4 34.0 4.0 4.0 – –
Nepal 57.8 107.0 43.1 78.3 78 55
Samoa 68.7 25.0 18.9 21.8 – –
Solomon Islands 70.8 25.0 – – – –
Tuvalu – – – – – –
Vanuatu 65.0 41.0 – – – –
Middle income 69 89 10 15 95 72
High income 78 15 – – 100 9637
Annex 3
LDC’s key economic indicators, 1998-2018
(in US$ million)
1998 2001 2005 2010 2015 2018

































































































































































































































































































1998 2001 2005 2010 2015 2018
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6


































































Notes: (1 Burkina Faso: 1998 and 2015 data are 1999 and 2014 data.
(2 Excluding grants on the part of Burkina Faso.
(3 Column 1 figures for the Gambia (1998) are 1999 data. Grants excluded from government
revenue.
(4 Column 1 figures for Guinea (1998) are 1999 data. Data for the years 2015 and 2018 are
the averages for the years 2009-2018.
(5 Figures in column 1 (1998) and column 6 (2018) for Guinea-Bissau are data for the years
1999 and 2019. Grants are not included in government revenue.
(6 Figures in column 1 (1998) and column 6 (2018) for Malawi are data for the years 1919 and
1999 data.
(7 Grants are not included in government revenue for Mali.
(8 Mauritania: 2010-18 data are average data for 2008-2017.
(9 Figures in column 6 (2018) for Mozambique are data for the year 2019. Grants are not
included in government revenue.
(10 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Niger are data for the year 1999 data and figures in column 5
(2015) and column 6 (2018) are the averages for the years 2014-16 and 2017-19. Grants
are not included in government revenue.
(11 Figures in column 1 (1998), column 4 (2010) and column 6 (2018) for Rwanda are data for
the years 1999, 2009 and 2019, respectively. Grants are not included in government
revenue
(12 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Sao Tome e Principe are data for the year 1999.
(13 Figures in column 4 (2010), column 5 (2015) and column 6 (2018) for Senegal are the
averages for the years 2009-18.
(14 2010-2019 data for Tanzania are the average data for the years 2009/10-2017/8.
(15 Figures in column 5 (2015) and column 6 (2018) for Zambia are the average data for the
years 2010-19. Grants are excluded from government revenue.
Source: Decision Point Documents for HIPC-LDCs (available at: www.imf.org).39
Annex 4
LDCs debt sustainability indicators, 1998-2018
in percentages
1998 2001 2005 2010 2015 2018
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Benin (1
NPV debt to exports
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1998 2001 2005 2010 2015 2018
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Rwanda (11
NPV debt to exports



























Sao Tome e Principe (12
NPV debt to exports
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U. R. Tanzania (14
NPV debt to exports
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Notes: (1 Assumed unconditional commitment of HIPC Initiative assistance for Benin as of end-1998
given in brackets.
(2 Figures in column 1 (1998) and column 5 (2015) for Burkina Faso are the data for the years
1999 and 2014. Assumed unconditional commitment of HIPC Initiative assistance given in
brackets.
(3 Figures in column 1 (1998) and column 6 (2018) for the Gambia are data for the years 1999
and 2019 data. Brackets indicate lower ratio in the first years if debt reduction is committed
unconditionally.
(4 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Guinea are 1999 data. Assumed unconditional commitment
of HIPC Initiative assistance given in brackets.
(5 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Guinea-Bissau are 1999 data. Brackets indicate lower ratio in
the first years if debt reduction is committed unconditionally.
(6 Figures in column 1 (1998) and column 6 (2018) for Malawi are data for the years 1999 and
2019, respectively. Brackets indicate lower ratio in the first years if debt reduction is
committed unconditionally.
(7 Figures in brackets assume for Mali hypothetical delivery of debt relief under the traditional
mechanisms, original and enhanced initiatives. Other figures assume delivery of assistance
under the enhanced HIPC Initiative starting in mid-2001.
(8 Figures in column 5 (2010) and column 6 (2018) for Mauritania are the average data for the
years 2008-17.
(9 Figures in column 6 (2018) for Mozambique are the year 2017 data.
(10 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Niger are the year 1999 data. Figures in column 5 (2015)
and column 6 (2018) are the averages for the years 2014-16 and 2017-19, respectively.
(11 Figures in column 1 (1998), column 5 (2010) and column 6 (2018) for Rwanda are the data41
for the years 1999, 2009 and 2019, respectively. brackets indicate lower ratio in the first
years if debt reduction is committed unconditionally.
(12 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Sao Tome e Principe are data for the year 1999. Brackets
indicate lower ratio in the first years if debt reduction is committed unconditionally.
(13 Figures in columns 4 (2010), 5 (2015) and 6 (2018) for Senegal are the averages for the
2009-18.
(14 Figures in columns 4 (2010), 5 (2015) and 6 (2018) for Tanzania are the averages for the
years for 2009/10-2017/18.
(15 Data for 1998 for Uganda include HIPC I assistance.
(16 Figures in column 1 (1998) for Zambia are the 1999-year data and data for 2015-18 are
average data for 2010-19.
Source: Decision Point Documents for HIPC-LDCs (available at: www.imf.org)42
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